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1. Introduction
Redistributive policies are among the most salient political issues in virtually all electoral
campaigns and scholars in economics and political science have long investigated voters’
attitudes toward this key policy dimension.1
Standard models of political economy indicate income as the main determinant of these
attitudes. This is “economic voting” (Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977; Meltzer and Richard,
1981): low-income voters should favor greater redistribution (hence, tax rates), while high-
income voters should oppose it. However, from an empirical point of view, this negative
correlation between income and support for redistribution is far from perfect.2 On the
one hand, a sizable fraction of working-class individuals are less in favor of redistribution
than what their material interest would suggest. On the other hand, segments of the so-
cioeconomic elites support high levels of redistribution, even though this hurts them from a
monetary point of view. These patterns are relevant from an empirical point of view (Gilens,
1999; Fong, 2001) and populate political chronicles with reports of blue-collar workers voting
against taxation and expressions such as “champagne socialists” or “radical chic”.
Although the deviations from economic voting highlighted above seem the two sides of the
same coin, the literature has mostly studied each of them in isolation. Papers that implicitly
or explicitly rely on some notion of reciprocity or solidarity (Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2000, Fong,
2001, Luttmer, 2001, Alesina and Glazer, 2004, Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014) can explain
1According to Pew Research Center, in 2016 US Presidential Election, 67% of registered voters deemed
social security as a very important topic for their voting decision. The percentages for other redistributive
policies such as health care and education were 74% and 66%, respectively. Similar numbers hold true for
recent elections in European countries.
2See Alesina and Giuliano (2011) and Costa-Font and Cowell (2015) for recent surveys. More in details,
attitudes toward redistribution have been explained through individual histories (Giuliano and Spilimbergo,
2014, Fisman et al., 2015), culture and race (Alesina and Glazer, 2004, Luttmer and Singhal, 2011), beliefs
concerning the returns to effort (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006a), subjective assessments of the fairness of market
outcomes (Fong, 2001, Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), social mobility (Piketty, 1995, Be´nabou and Ok, 2001,
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Acharya, 2014, Alesina et al., 2018), issues of group loyalty and social identity
(Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2000, Luttmer, 2001, Corneo and Gru¨ner, 2002, Shayo, 2009, Cervellati et al., 2010), or
the structure of inequality (Lupu and Pontusson, 2011).
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why the elites support high levels of redistribution.3 However, they cannot easily rationalize
why non-negligible fractions of the less well-off dislike high taxes, unless they assume that
these individuals have wrong perceptions about relative standings in society. Papers that
highlight the role of social identity or the relative position of the middle class in the income
distribution (Shayo, 2009, Lupu and Pontusson, 2001) can instead easily rationalize the
first discrepancy (low-income citizens voting against high taxes) but have harder times in
explaining the second deviation (members of the elite favoring high taxes). Finally, papers
that focus on agents’ expectations about future prospects (Piketty, 1995; Be´nabou and Ok,
2001; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006a) can potentially generate both behaviors, but this would
require prospects of opposite sign to be simultaneously and somehow counterintuitively at
play within the same society: members of the working class voting against high taxes because
they expect that they will soon climb the social ladder and members of the elite favoring
high taxes as they fear downward mobility.4
In this paper, we introduce a model that simultaneously rationalizes both deviations de-
scribed above, while still postulating that voters are self-interested. This is done by assuming
that voters’ preferences toward redistribution are shaped not only by monetary payoffs, but
also by status-seeking considerations.5
In our model, voters differ across two dimensions: productivity and social class. Produc-
tivity determines the voter’s income and, ultimately, his level of consumption. Social class
captures those factors that are associated with the voter’s socioeconomic background and
affect his social status even after controlling for the income effects they may entail. Examples
3Other explanations for the support toward redistribution among the elites include pure warm-glow effects
or the instrumental desire to keep the level of inequality in the society low to reduce the risk of revolutions
against the status quo (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000).
4Probabilistic voting models a` la Dixit and Londregan (1998) could also generate both deviations from
standard economic voting. However, this would be the result of exogenous shocks. Instead, in the framework
analyzed in this paper, deviations from economic voting are related to measurable individual and societal
parameters. This enables comparative statics and cross-country comparisons.
5Status-seeking behavior has been identified as an important driver of economic choices in many envi-
ronments, including consumption choices (Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004), financial strategies (Barberis and
Thaler, 2003), and engagement in prosocial activities (Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006b).
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include his cultural level or the social network that he inherits from his family (Lin, 1999).
In line with standard indexes of socioeconomic status (Hollingshead, 2011), we assume that
social status is a multidimensional attribute that is jointly determined by an individual’s
level of consumption and social class.6
Formally, we define social status as a weighted average of the voter’s standing in the
two dimensions and we assume that the larger the (positive or negative) distance between
the voter’s relevant characteristics and the average levels in the population, the larger the
(positive or negative) effects on his well-being. We thus follow the well-known “Keep up
with the Joneses” formulation (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004).
However, our model displays two distinguishing features. First, as already discussed, social
status is a multidimensional attribute and, in each dimension, larger deviations from the
average have a stronger impact on individual’s utility. This links our paper to the literature
on salience in consumer’s choice (Bordalo et al. 2012, 2013), which postulates that attributes
that stand out the most from the average have a larger impact on the utility of individuals.
Second, we let the weights that define the relevance of consumption and social class to be
endogenously determined by the distribution of voters’ characteristics in the society. In
particular, as the dispersion in one of the two dimensions of heterogeneity increases, the
weight associated to such dimension increases at the detriment of the weight of the other
dimension. Put differently, the more disperse consumption (respectively, social class) is in
the population, the more visible are the differences in relative consumption (social class),
the larger is the relative impact that consumption (social class) has in determining social
status. This assumption shares the same intuition underlying the literature on focusing
(see Ko˝szegi and Szeidl, 2013, Nunnari and Za´pal, 2018, and the references therein) and,
in the context of social concerns, is in line with the social rank hypothesis discussed in the
6See Gilman (1981), Henrich and Boyd (2008) and Dow and Reed (2013) for historical and evolutionary
arguments that testify the salience of social class in determining social status.
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psychological and sociological literature (see Walasek and Brown, 2015, 2016 for evidence
on the positive correlation between income inequality and status-seeking behavior). Finally,
it is also coherent with the emerging literature on the causes and consequences of “status
anxiety” (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009; Layte, 2012; Layte and Whelan 2014; Delhey and
Dragolov, 2014).
Because the dispersion of consumption in the society is affected by the tax rate, in our
model taxation not only redistributes resources from the rich to the poor, but it also modifies
the relative importance of the two dimensions of social comparison. Due to this latter effect,
social elites (low social classes) may use taxation as a strategic tool to preserve the advantage
(eliminate the disadvantage) they have in terms of social class. We label such strategic use
of taxation social-class voting.
In line with this insight and with survey evidence reported in Section 2, our first set of
results highlights how social concerns influence individual attitudes toward redistribution.
We show that citizens’ preferred policy (i.e., their optimal tax rate) is monotonic in each of
the two dimensions of social comparison separately: within any given social class, a voter’s
preferred tax rate is decreasing in income; instead, for any given level of productivity, it is
increasing in social class. Therefore, on the one hand, social comparisons over consumption
amplify economic voting with low-income individuals demanding even higher levels of redis-
tribution, while the opposite holds true for high-income individuals. On the other hand, due
to comparisons over social class, social-class voting pushes individuals in high (low) classes
to favor (oppose) raises in taxation. When status concerns over social class dominate those
over consumption, affluent individuals in high social classes may support relatively high lev-
els of redistribution. Interestingly, such support does not stem from fairness or altruistic
considerations, neither it emerges as a form of noblesse oblige. Instead, it is purely strategic
and self-interested, as it allows members of the social elite to differentiate themselves from
5
the nouveau riche. Symmetrically, individuals in low social classes with moderately low pro-
ductivity may be less favorable to redistribution than what economic voting would dictate,
in an attempt to boost the relevance of the dimension over which they have a comparative
advantage. We also show that social concerns lead to an overall increase in the polarization
of voters’ preferences independently of which of the two dimensions of social comparisons
(consumption or social class) receives the larger weight. More in general, our characterization
allows comparative statics and cross-country comparisons that highlight the impact of social
concerns and of heterogeneity in the electorate on individual preferences for redistribution.
We then study how individual preferences aggregate. To this goal, we show that in
our model we can collapse one of the two dimensions of voters’ heterogeneity and smoothly
aggregate the preferences of the voters whose utility functions are strictly concave in taxation.
As a result, we can characterize interclass coalitions of voters sharing the same preferred
level of redistribution. These coalitions include relatively less productive voters in low social
classes and relatively more productive voters in high social classes. When the relevance
of social concerns is not too high, the structure of these coalitions and the dimensionwise
monotonicity of individual preferences we described above, enable us to prove the existence of
a unique political equilibrium in a Downsian model of electoral competition. The equilibrium
tax rate is the Condorcet winner that emerges as the preferred tax rate of the decisive voter,
namely a generic voter in the “median” coalition obtained after the collapse of one of the two
dimensions of heterogeneity. We discuss how this tax rate varies with the overall importance
of social concerns. Finally, we show that when the relevance of social concerns becomes too
high, Condorcet cycles may emerge and a Downsian political equilibrium may fail to exist.
Our paper investigates the relationship between status-seeking behavior and preferences
for redistribution. In this respect, it is related to recent papers by Levy and Razin (2015)
and Koenig et al. (2017).
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Levy and Razin (2015) study preferences for redistribution in a setting where individuals
positively sort according to income. In their model, agents interact only with individuals
that belong to the same “club”, with more prestigious clubs being more rewarding but also
more costly to join (examples include the choice of a child’s school or the marriage market).
When income inequality is high, individuals in the middle class have strong incentives to sort
so to avoid mixing with the poor. Thus, to preserve the benefits of sorting, they may oppose
redistribution despite having an income below the mean. At the opposite, when income
inequality is low, the benefits from sorting are low too. As a result, middle class members
may support higher redistribution even though their income may be above the average.
Compared to Levy and Razin (2015), our model starts from similar premises: by decreasing
income inequality, redistribution impacts on agents’ well-being not only because it affects
their disposable income but also because it triggers some additional “social” effects. In Levy
and Razin (2015), inequality modifies the incentives to sort; in our model, inequality affects
the weights that define an agent’s social status. Differently from Levy and Razin (2015),
we exploit multidimensional heterogeneity to show that the change in social weights can
rationalize both deviations from economic voting simultaneously, within the same society
and holding fixed the income distribution.
Koenig et al. (2017) study how status concerns may shape individual preferences about
the provision of public good when a market alternative exists. In their setting, rich indi-
viduals support public provision to maintain the exclusivity of the private substitute and
thus signal their social prestige. Our model is different from Koenig et al. (2017) in two
respects. First, whereas Koenig et al. (2017) look at public good provision, we consider
redistribution. Second, although in both models the coalition of voters supporting a given
policy can be heterogeneous in terms of income, in our setting individuals with the same
income may support different policies because of their social classes.
7
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide some motivating evidence
based on survey data. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 focuses on voters’ pre-
ferred tax rate. Section 5 studies the aggregation of preferences and the resulting political
equilibrium. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Motivating Evidence
As discussed in the Introduction, the literature (cf. footnote 2) has long recognized that
income is not the only driver of agents’ preferences for redistribution. The same litera-
ture has also highlighted that voters’ attitudes towards redistribution and the actual size of
redistributive policies are subject to large cross-country heterogeneity, in particular if one
compares continental Europe with the US. In this paper we argue that social concerns in
terms of consumption and social class may correlate with voters’ redistributive attitudes,
hence with such cross-country heterogeneity.
To gather evidence on these correlations, we consider survey data from the European
Social Survey (henceforth, ESS) and the General Social Survey (henceforth, GSS). The
combined dataset covers 33 countries, including most European countries, Russia, Turkey,
Israel and the United States. The Data Appendix provides details on the dataset and on the
variables of interest.
Table 1 reports the results of a logit model in which we regress attitudes toward redis-
tribution against several controls as well as country and year fixed effects. In the analysis,
respondents are coded to be against redistribution if they disagree with the statement “Gov-
ernment should reduce differences in income levels”. Instead, we capture the relevance of
social concerns with a dummy that equals 1 if the respondent thinks that it is important
to be popular and admired.7 To better highlight cross-country differences in the impact of
7More precisely, the dummy variable Social Concerns equals 1 if a respondent in the GSS thinks that
8
social concerns, we present the results for three separate subsamples: Europe as a whole,
Western Europe and US.8 All our results get through also if we run the regression on the
whole set of countries using properly defined dummy variables to account for continents’
differences (see Table A3 in the Data Appendix).
Several patterns stand out. First, well-established empirical results (cf. Alesina and
Giuliano, 2009) hold true even if we control for the importance of social concerns. Economic
voting emerges in all models: rich individuals (variable High Income equal to 1) are more
likely to oppose redistribution than poor individuals. Educational achievements of the re-
spondent and of the father also reduce the suppport for redistribution (variables High School,
College, Father’s High School and Father’s College). Insofar these variables are positively
correlated with the respondent’s lifetime income, this is additional evidence of economic
voting.9 Women are more favorable to redistribution than men, while working and mar-
ried individuals tend to oppose it.10 Not surprisingly, self-assessed political positioning—as
measured by liberal and conservative dummies—is also correlated with redistributive pref-
erences.11
Table 1 also shows how social concerns correlate with redistributive attitudes. Variables
Social Concerns and Social Concerns & High Income imply that both in Europe and in the
US, social concerns amplify economic voting and thus increase the polarization of redistribu-
“to be well liked or popular” is one of the three most important aspects of life or if a respondent in the ESS
agrees with the statement that “it is important to show abilities and to be admired”. The lack of similar
questions in the World Value Survey impeded us to further expand the dataset.
8The reason to look at Western Europe in isolation is twofold. First, a large part of the literature about the
“continent divide” in redistributive preferences compares Western Europe and the US. Second, the attitudes
toward government intervention in Eastern European countries are likely to be affected by the historical role
played by the Soviet Union and communism.
9Focusing on the US only, having a father who completed high school is positively correlated with being
against redistribution, while the opposite holds true if the father completed college. Nonetheless, having a
father who completed both high school and college remains positively correlated with being against redistri-
bution.
10These last two patterns are statistically significant respectively in Europe and in the US; however, they
also hold true in the entire dataset (see Table A3 in the Data Appendix).
11Table A3 in the Data Appendix also shows that, in line with the literature on the continental divide (see
among others Piketty, 1995, Alesina and Angeletos, 2005, Be´nabou and Tirole, 2006a), US respondents are
more likely to oppose redistribution than Europeans.
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tive preferences.12 Moreover, consider the variable Social Concerns & Father’s High School,
which captures the interaction between the relevance that the respondent assigns to social
concerns and the educational achievement of the father. Among European respondents this
variable is correlated with support for redistribution (i.e., less disagreement with the state-
ment in Table 1). Further controlling for the father’s college education and the respondent’s
political positioning (columns 4 and 5) does not undermine this correlation. To the extent
that parents’ education influences the respondent’s social standing even after controlling for
income effects (say, it affects both income and social network or cultural level), we take
this as evidence of social-class voting: redistribution receives stronger support among so-
cioeconomic elites. The same pattern does not hold for the US. This is in line with the
idea that social class-voting is more relevant in older and less mobile societies such as Eu-
rope (cf. Alesina and Angeletos, 2005), where for historical and cultural reasons the family
background impacts significantly on individuals’ socioeconomic status.
The fact that in our regressions we proxy the respondent’s social class with the father’s
educational level deserves some further clarifications. The choice is grounded on the socio-
logical literature showing that education is one of the main determinants of social standing
(Hollingshead, 2011) and that such standing is, at least to some extent, transmitted across
generations (Bjo¨rklund and Ja¨ntti, 2009, Black and Devereux, 2011). The reason we focus
on the father’s educational level as opposed to the respondent’s one is twofold. First, the re-
spondent’s educational achievement is likely to depend on her skills and effort and the social
status that it generates would then be less correlated with her social background. Second,
the data show that 81.9% of the respondents completed high school, as opposed to 58.9% if
one considers their fathers.13 Thus, the completion of high school is likely to have a stronger
12In particular, social concerns amplify the opposition to redistribution among high-income earners in
Europe and strengthen the support for redistribution among low-income earners in the US.
13Splitting the data as in Table 1, the percentages become 85.9% vs. 71.3% in the US, 81.4% vs. 57.6%
in Europe, and 79.5% vs. 55.9% in Western Europe.
11
impact on fathers’ social class rather than on the respondents’ one.
To sum up, social concerns appear to correlate with redistributive preferences in two
separate and somehow opposite ways. If interacted with the economic status of the respon-
dent, they strengthen economic voting. This channel is active both in Europe and in the US,
suggesting that social concerns in the consumption dimension are relevant in both locations.
The interaction of social concerns with the respondent’s social background instead shows
that members of high social classes tend to favor redistributive policies more than those who
belong to low social classes. This second channel appears to be relevant only in Europe,
namely in a less mobile society where family background is still an important determinant
of an individual’s social status.14
3. The Model
A society is made by a unit mass of citizens. Citizens are heterogeneous in two dimensions:
productivity and social class. Productivity is represented by the parameter θ ∈ [θmin, θmax] =
Θ ⊆ [0,∞). Social class is represented by the parameter k ∈ [kmin, kmax] = K ⊆ [0,∞).
As explained in the Introduction, a citizen’s social class captures the set of socioeconomic
characteristics that affect the individual’s social standing even after controlling for his pro-
ductivity/income, for instance the social capital he inherited from his parents.15
14In the Data Appendix, we show that the same patterns hold true also if we define as high-income earners
individuals that are substantially above the median (Table A4). Moreover, we also show that among European
respondents the correlation between preferences for redistribution and the interaction of social concerns and
income can be attributed to social concerns in the consumption dimension, while the one between preferences
for redistribution and the interaction of social concerns and social background cannot (Table A5). This
suggests that the various dimensions of social status may impact preferences for redistribution differently as
our model shows. The lack of suitable variables in the GSS prevents us from extending this analysis to US
respondents.
15Although we consider social class as the second dimension of heterogeneity, our model is general enough
to potentially accommodate other characteristics. Examples may include age, IQ, health, ethnicity, height,
beauty. See Persson and Tabellini (2002) for a model in which age, together with income, influences prefer-
ences for redistribution. For these alternative characteristics to be socially valuable, they must be publicly
observable or easily inferable. Moreover, to fit into our model, they should also be exogenous and the gov-
ernment should be unable to tax them directly. We focus on social class both because of its importance in
determining social status (see the references in footnote 6), and because some of these other factors can be
incorporated in our definition of social class.
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Each citizen is thus characterized by the pair (θ, k) ∈ Θ ×K = T , which we refer to as
the citizen’s type. Types are distributed in the population according to the joint cumulative
density function F (θ, k), with pdf f(θ, k), that we assume to be positive for all (θ, k). Let θ
and θm denote the average and the median productivity in the population. Similarly, let k
and km denote the average and the median social class. In line with the literature and the
empirical evidence, we assume that θm < θ.
Citizens inelastically supply one unit of labor in a perfectly competitive labor market.
Labor yields an output equal to the citizen’s productivity and the price of such output is
normalized to 1. Then, in exchange of his labor, type (θ, k) receives a wage equal to θ.
The government taxes income through a proportional tax rate τ ∈ [0, 1]. Tax revenues
are then used to finance the provision of a lump-sum monetary transfer g to all citizens.
Borrowing is not allowed. Therefore, the tax rate τ and the transfer g must satisfy the
budget constraint: g ≤ τθ.
The level of consumption of type (θ, k) and the average level of consumption in the
population are thus respectively given by:
c (τ, g | θ, k) = (1− τ) θ + g; (1)
c(τ, g) = (1− τ) θ + g. (2)
Taxes have distortionary effects that negatively affect all citizens. Formally, these distor-
tions are captured by a strictly increasing and strictly convex function, ` : [0, 1]→ R+, which
we assume to be sufficiently convex to guarantee that, absent social concerns (see below),
all voters have a preferred level of taxation below one.16 Although these distortions can
be microfounded by modeling individuals’ labor/leisure decisions,17 we model them through
16Formally, we assume d`(0)/dτ = 0 and d`(1)/dτ > θ − θmin. All our insights would go through if
distortions increase with individuals’ productivity.
17In such microfoundation, taxation would generate both a substitution effect due to the change in the
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function ` in order to focus on the effects of social concerns on redistributive preferences,
rather than on the inefficiencies that redistribution creates. If tax distortions were absent, we
could still characterize agents’ preferred tax rates (see Section 4). However, the aggregation
of individual preferences would not generalize (see Section 5).
The consumption utility of individuals is given by:
u(τ, g | θ, k) = (1− τ)θ + g − `(τ). (3)
Importantly, citizens care not only about their consumption utility, but also about their
social status. A citizen’s social status is determined by his standing in terms of consumption
and social class. In particular, the social status of an individual with type (θ, k) is captured
by the function S
(
c− c, k − k) : R×R→ R, which is strictly increasing in both its arguments
and such that S (0, 0) = 0. Intuitively, the social status of an individual is higher (lower), the
larger is the positive (negative) gap between the agent’s attributes (his level of consumption
and his social class) and the average values in the population.18 Then:
S
(
c− c, k − k) = η · (Wc · (c− c) +Wk · (k − k)) . (4)
The parameter η ≥ 0 captures the overall importance of social status considerations, while
Wc ∈ [0, 1] and Wk ∈ [0, 1] denote the relative weights of consumption and social class in
determining status.
cost of one unit of consumption in terms of leisure and an income effect due to the change in the total value
of the individual’s time endowment. Aggregate distortions from taxation would then require substitution
effects to be stronger than income effects, or, equivalently, aggregate labor supply to adjust negatively to an
increase in taxation.
18We thus assume that social status depends in a cardinal way on an individual’s standing. A similar
formulation appears, among others, in Cooper et al. (2001), Bowles and Park (2005), and Gallice and Grillo
(2018). An alternative approach assumes that status depends in an ordinal way on an individual’s relative
standing (see for instance, Hopkins and Kornienko, 2004, and Becker et al., 2005). The two approaches may
lead to different implications (see Clark and Oswald, 1998, for differences in the attitudes towards emulation
and deviance, or Bilancini and Boncinelli, 2012, for differences in the impact of redistributive policies and the
relevance of social waste when status is determined by the consumption of a conspicuous good).
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In line with the literature linking income inequality, status-seeking behavior and status
anxiety (cf. Introduction) and similarly to the approach used in recent models of focusing
(Ko˝szegi and Szeidl, 2013; Nunnari and Za´pal, 2018), we let Wc and Wk be increasing in
the dispersion of the relevant variable. As a measure of dispersion, we use the standard
deviation.19 Thus, as the standard deviation in consumption levels widens (respectively,
shrinks), the importance of consumption in determining the agent’s overall status increases
(respectively, decreases). The same is true for social class. Formally:
Wc (σc, σk) =
σc
σc + λσk
, Wk (σc, σk) =
λσk
σc + λσk
, (5)
where σc is the standard deviation of consumption in the population, σk is the standard
deviation of social class in the population, and λ > 0 is a rescaling factor that makes the two
standard deviations comparable. Our analysis goes through if we assume other functional
forms for the social weights as long as an increase in the dispersion in one dimension has
the joint effect of increasing the weight on such dimension and decreasing the weight on the
other dimension.20
19To model focusing, Ko˝szegi and Szeidl (2013) postulate that the weight that a consumer attaches to a
certain attribute is increasing in the range of the consumption utility that the various alternatives generate
with respect to such attribute. In our model, weights are not mediated by consumption utility and they are
increasing in the standard deviation, rather than in the range. As we model social standings using distance
from the first moment in the population, it is somehow natural to measure dispersion using a function of
the second moment (the actual choice of standard deviation as opposed to variance or to the second moment
itself is done for analytical tractability). Moreover, the standard deviation depends on the density of the
distribution; thus, we think that it is better suited to handle a model with a continuum of individuals, whose
characteristics are distributed according to some cumulative density function.
20Our model also shares some similarities with models of salience in consumer’s choice a` la Bordalo et al.,
(2012, 2013). Indeed, both approaches assume a positive relation between the degree with which a certain
characteristic/dimension stands out and their impact on the utility of individuals. However, differently
from salience, we let the strength of such relation be a smooth function of the relative dispersion of each
characteristic in the population—see (5)—which is affected by the policy variable τ . This enables us to study
the effects of social concerns on individuals’ preferences for redistribution.
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4. Social Concerns and Individual Preferences
A citizen’s total utility is given by the sum of consumption utility and status-seeking
considerations. Formally, the utility of type (θ, k) is given by:
v(τ, g | θ, k) = u (τ, g | θ, k) + S (c− c, k − k) =
= (1− τ) θ + g − `(τ) + η
(
(1− τ)2 σθ
(1− τ)σθ + λσk
(
θ − θ)+ λσk
(1− τ)σθ + λσk
(
k − k)) . (6)
Policies (τ∗(θ, k), g∗(θ, k)) maximize (6) subject to g ≤ τθ and thus constitute the pre-
ferred policies of the voter (θ, k).21 Obviously, such policies satisfy the budget constraint
with equality. Thus, from now on, we will focus on the optimal tax rate, τ∗(θ, k), only.
In what follows, it is convenient to rescale types so that they represent distances from
the population averages. Thus, each voter (θ, k) is identified by (θd, kd) =
(
θ − θ, k − k). We
denote the joint distribution of (θd, kd) with Fd(θd, kd), its pdf with fd(θd, kd), the rescaled
supports with [θd,min, θd,max] and [kd,min, kd,max] and the rescaled median productivity with
θmd . We can then classify citizens in four different groups:
i. The working class. These are voters who are below the average both in terms of
productivity and social class, θd ≤ 0 and kd ≤ 0.
ii. The nouveau riche. These are voters who are more productive than the average, but
belong to low social classes, θd > 0 and kd ≤ 0.
iii. The new poors. These are voters who are less productive than the average, but belong
to a relatively high social class, θd ≤ 0 and kd > 0.
21It is immediate to verify that τ∗(θ, k) is non-empty, compact and upperhemicontinuous. When τ∗(θ, k)
is a singleton, we abuse notation and write τ∗(θ, k) to denote its unique value. Moreover, to simplify the
exposition, we assume that the set of maximizers is a singleton for all voters. None of the results we provide
hinges on this simplification.
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iv. The elite. These are voters who are above the average both in terms of productivity
and social class, θd > 0 and kd > 0.
Substituting for the government’s budget constraint, we can compute the effect of a
change in the level of redistribution (as measured by the size of τ) on the utility of type
(θd, kd) as follows:
∂v(τ, τθ | θd, kd)
∂τ
= −θd − d`(τ)
dτ︸ ︷︷ ︸
economic voting
+ ησθ · λσkkd − (1− τ) ((1− τ)σθ + 2λσk) θd
((1− τ)σθ + λσk)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
impact of social concerns
. (7)
Two forces are at play in (7). The first force captures economic voting and does not
depend on social concerns: an increase in the level of taxation benefits individuals whose
income is below average (θd < 0), as what they pay is less than what they get, and harms
those whose income is above average (θd > 0), as what they pay is more than what they
get. Furthermore, the distortionary effect of taxation pushes against high levels of taxation.
The second force captures the impact of social concerns. Since an increase in taxation
reduces the dispersion in net income, it reduces the standard deviation of consumption. As
such, it decreases the relevance of consumption and increases the relevance of social class
in determining an individual’s status. This may benefit or harm the individual depending
on his position in the two dimensions. The effect is certainly negative for the nouveau
riche and certainly positive for the new poors. In the remaining two groups (the working
class and the elite), the effect can go in either direction depending on which of the two
dimensions the agent stands out the most. If it is consumption (namely, if the absolute
value of θd is sufficiently larger than the one of kd), social concerns amplify economic voting:
low productive individuals in the working class prefer even higher redistribution, while high
productive individuals in the elite more strongly oppose it. Instead, if social class stands
out (i.e., the absolute value of kd is sufficiently larger than the one of θd), social-class voting
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emerges: members of the working class (elite) support lower (higher) levels of redistribution
in order to overcome their disadvantage (protect their advantage) in terms of social class.
The citizen’s relative standing in the two dimensions of social comparison also affects the
concavity or convexity of his utility function with respect to taxation:
∂2v(τ, τθ | θd, kd)
∂τ2
= −d
2`(τ)
dτ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax distortions
+ 2ησθλσk · λσkθd + σθkd
((1− τ)σθ + λσk)3︸ ︷︷ ︸
impact of social concerns
. (8)
Consider first a situation in which taxes are not distortionary (i.e., `(τ) ≡ 0). Then, the
sign of (8) would be determined by the sign of the second term, so that the utility function
would be concave for members of the working class and convex for members of the elite. For
the nouveau riche and the new poors, it could be either convex or concave.22 Starting from
this baseline, tax distortions introduce concavity with respect to taxation. In Section 5, we
exploit this fact to aggregate individual preferences.
We can now characterize the preferred level of taxation of generic type (θd, kd). As a first
step, consider the limit case in which social concerns do not exist (η = 0). Individuals then
follow pure economic voting and trade-off their private marginal benefit from the redistribu-
tive scheme against marginal tax distortions. We refer to this situation as the benchmark
case, indexed by B.
Remark 1. If social concerns do not exist (η = 0), then a voter’s optimal tax rate is given
by τ∗B(θd, kd) = τ
∗
B(θd) = max
{
0, d`−1(−θd)/dτ
}
.
Now consider the case in which social concerns exist (η > 0). Agents’ preferred level of
taxation is then shaped by both economic voting and social-class voting. Our first result
22More precisely, the function is convex (concave) if and only if the “standardized” advantage that agents
enjoy in one dimension is stronger (weaker) than the “standardized” disadvantage they suffer in the other.
Formally, the function is convex if and only if θd/σθ > kd/(λσk) and concave if and only if θd/σθ ≤ kd/(λσk).
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shows that a citizen’s preferred policy is monotonic in each of his characteristics separately.
Thus, within a given social class, standard economic voting holds: more productive individ-
uals want lower levels of redistribution. Similarly, holding productivity (and thus income)
fixed, social-class voting holds: individuals in higher social classes are more favorable to
redistribution.
Proposition 1. τ∗(θd, kd) is non-increasing in θd for every kd and non-decreasing in kd for
every θd.
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Proposition 1 enables us to characterize agents’ preferred level of taxation and study
how social concerns affect it. In the interest of clarity, we focus on each of the four groups
separately. Figure 1 illustrates the results for the special case in which `(τ) = τ2.
Working Class. Since θd ≤ 0 and kd ≤ 0, the utility function of any voter in this class is
strictly concave in taxation—see (8). Then, even in the presence of social concerns, τ∗B(θd)
(cf. Remark 1) remains the unique optimal tax rate for all those voters for whom the
last term in (7) is equal to 0. We can thus define a function h : [θd,min, 0] → [kd,min, 0]
that splits working-class voters in three groups, depending on how their preferred tax rate
compares with τ∗B(θd).
24 Individuals (θd, h(θd)) have a preferred tax rate exactly equal
to τ∗B(θd). Proposition 1 then implies that individuals (θd, kd) with kd > h(θd) have a
preferred level of taxation higher than the one in the benchmark model. For these agents—
highlighted with horizontal lines in Figure 1—social concerns reinforce economic voting. On
the contrary, individuals (θd, kd) with kd < h(θd) have an optimal tax rate that is lower than
the benchmark. The preferences of these voters—highlighted with vertical lines in Figure
1—are mostly driven by social-class voting: they support little redistribution to reduce the
23These relationships are strict whenever the optimal tax rate is in the interior of [0, 1]. The same is true
for all subsequent propositions.
24Formally, h(θd) = max {(1− τ∗B(θd)) ((1− τ∗B(θd))σθ + 2λσk) θd/(λσk), kd,min} . It is immediate to check
that h(0) = 0 and the function is increasing.
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θd,min θd,max
kd,min
kd,max
(0, 0)
τ∗(θd, kd) > τ∗B(θd)
τ∗(θd, kd) = τ∗B(θd) = 0
τ∗(θd, kd) = τ∗B(θd) = 0
τ∗(θd, kd) > τ∗B(θd)
τ∗(θd, kd) < τ∗B(θd)
τ∗(θd, kd) > τ∗B(θd)
h(θd)
h(θd)
Elite
Working Class Nouveau Riche
New Poors
θd
kd
Figure 1. The effect of social concerns on agents’ preferred tax rate.
prominence of their low social class.
Nouveau riche. For these voters social concerns unambiguously push against redistribu-
tion. Indeed, taxation simultaneously decreases the relevance of consumption (the dimension
over which these individuals are strong) and increases the relevance of social class (the di-
mension over which they are weak). As a result, the optimal tax rate for these individuals
is equal to 0 and coincides with the one of the benchmark model.
New poors. For these voters, the situation is opposite to the one of the nouveau riche.
Thus, they support higher tax rates than in the benchmark model.
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Elite. Also within the elite, we can define a function h : (0, θd,max]→ (0, kd,max] that splits
voters on the basis of how social concerns impact on their redistributive preferences.25 Voters
(θd, kd) with kd ≤ h(θd)—highlighted in grey in Figure 1—have a preferred tax rate equal to
zero, identical to the one in the benchmark model. Instead, voters (θd, kd) with kd > h(θd)
have an optimal tax rate that is strictly positive. For these latter individuals—highlighted
with horizontal lines in Figure 1—social-class voting dominates: despite being net losers
from the redistributive scheme, they support a positive taxation to preserve their advantage
in terms of social class.
The next proposition summarizes the effect of social concerns on voters’ preferred tax
rate and describes some properties of function h.
Proposition 2. Let η > 0. There exists a weakly increasing function h : [θd,min, θd,max] →
[kd,min, kd,max] such that: (i) h(0) = 0, (ii) h(θd) is constant in η if θd ≤ 0, and non-
increasing in η if θd > 0, (iii) for any θd ∈ [θd,min, 0], τ∗(θd, kd) is non-decreasing in η if
kd ≥ h(θd) and non-increasing in η otherwise, and (iv) for any θd ∈ (0, θd,max], τ∗(θd, kd) is
non-decreasing in η.
Proposition 2 (and Figure 1) can also guide some cross-country comparisons whose results
are in line with the motivating evidence discussed in Section 2. Consider for instance two
countries A and B that are similarly heterogeneous in terms of productivity (hence, income).
However, in country A social classes do not play much of a role. This could be the case
for “young” countries in which social stratification based on inherited background is not
particularly strong (e.g., the US). Our model dictates that in country A the main driver of
social status is income. Figure 1 then shows that if the vast majority of voters concentrates
25The analysis differs from the one carried out for the working class in two dimensions. First, if social
concerns are absent, the optimal tax rate of voters in the elite is equal to zero; thus, social concerns can
only (weakly) raise their preferred taxation. Second, the utility function of individuals in the elite is not
necessarily concave in taxation and thus function h must be defined differently. See the proof of Proposition
2 for details.
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around the x-axis, both the elite and the working class are highly homogeneous in their
redistributive preferences. The elite is solidly against taxation, whereas the working class
is largely in favor of it. In other words, and as already discussed, social concerns amplify
economic voting and the latter describes the behavior of the large majority of the population.
Suppose instead that in country B social stratification has a longer tradition and it is
thus more important (e.g., Europe). Voters thus spread out more evenly across the two
dimensions. In Figure 1, this corresponds to a situation in which a significant mass of voters
concentrates around the y-axis as well. Then, in country B, social-class voting should be a
more relevant phenomenon and a sizable fraction of individuals with high social background
should support redistribution.26
On a similar vein, we can also perform cross-country comparisons with respect to the
relevance of social status considerations, η. Let countries C and D be identical in the distri-
bution of types, but say that status concerns are more relevant in country C than in country
D. Point (ii) in Proposition 2 indicates that the fraction of the working class that engages in
social-class voting would be the same in both countries, whereas the fraction of the elite that
follows social-class voting would be (weakly) larger in country C. Moreover, as highlighted
by points (iii) and (iv) in Proposition 2, a change in η also modifies voters’ optimal tax
rate. In particular, and referring to Figure 1, any voter in the area highlighted with vertical
(horizontal) lines of country C has a lower (higher) preferred tax rate than the same citizen
in country D. As a result, the sorting of voters based on their income along the traditional
redistribution cleavage will be more noisy in country C than in country D.27
26Applying a symmetric argument, a mean preserving spread of the distribution of productivity holding
fixed the level of social stratification would amplify economic voting. Instead, shocks that shift the entire
distribution of productivity have no consequences on individual preferences as the latter are determined by
the voter’s relative position in the society, which remains unaffected.
27All these cross-country comparisons, as well as the the results concerning polarization discussed below
(cf. Proposition 3), provide testable implications about the relationships linking redistributive preferences
with social concerns and measures of dispersion in the population. These implications also distinguish our
paper from models a` la Dixit and Londregan (1998), where deviations from economic voting are due to
exogenous shocks.
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Because social concerns affect voters’ preferred level of taxation, they also impact on the
level of polarization of redistributive preferences. Let polarization be given by the difference
between the average preferred tax rate of the voters who are more favorable to redistribution
—the new poor— and the average preferred tax rate of the voters who more strongly oppose
it —the nouveau riche:28
Π =
kd,max∫
0
0∫
θd,min
τ∗(θd, kd)fd(θd, kd)dθddkd −
0∫
kd,min
θd,max∫
0
τ∗(θd, kd)fd(θd, kd)dθdkd. (9)
Proposition 3. Polarization is weakly increasing in η. Furthermore, it is weakly increasing
in σθ (weakly decreasing in σk) if σθ < λσk.
The first part of Proposition 3 follows from Proposition 2: when the relevance of social
concerns goes up, new poors want higher levels of redistribution, while the nouveau riche
still support no redistribution (see Figure 1). Thus, polarization goes up.
The second part of Proposition 3 further says that polarization is increasing in the dis-
persion in productivity (hence, income) when such dispersion is not too high. However, when
the standard deviation in productivity becomes larger than the one in social class, such re-
lationship does not necessarily hold. To gain intuition, observe that an increase in σθ affects
preferences for redistribution only through status-seeking considerations. In particular, we
can identify two effects. On the one hand, weight Wc goes up, reinforcing economic voting.
This pushes polarization up. On the other hand, weight Wk decreases and thus social-class
voting becomes less important. Because social-class voting is one of the reasons pushing
the new poors to support redistribution, this second effect may lead to a decrease in their
28To simplify notation, the following expression assumes that the new poor have a unique preferred tax
rate. See the proof of Proposition 3 for an exact definition. Other definitions of polarization are possible.
For instance, one could consider the difference between the average preferred tax rate in the xth percentile
of most productive voters and the average preferred tax rate in the xth percentile of least productive voters.
In this case, the results of Proposition 3 would hold true if, given distribution Fd(θd, kd), the former group of
voters is sufficiently concentrated in the region highlighted with horizontal lines in Figure 1, and the latter
in the remaining regions. In turn, this would be the case if the marginal distribution of productivity, Fθ(θ),
is not excessively left-skewed.
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preferred level of taxation, hence polarization. If σθ is large, the second effect can dominate
and the overall effect on polarization can become negative.
The results in Proposition 3 can be related to the growing literature linking political
polarization with measures of inequality (McCarty et al., 2006; Voorheis et al., 2015). The
majority of these studies identifies a positive correlation between these two variables, which is
compatible with our model. Nonetheless, Pontusson and Rueda (2008) points at large cross-
country heterogeneity in this correlation. Furthermore, focusing on preferences concerning
redistribution and welfare spending, Barth et al. (2015) find that inequality has no effect on
polarization, while Haggard et al. (2013) show that in developing countries higher levels of
inequality may even decrease the demand for redistribution and thus dampen polarization.
Proposition 3 suggests that this cross-country heterogeneity could be explained through the
lenses of our model by the two opposing channels we just described.
5. Interclass Coalitions and Aggregation of Preferences
In Section 4 we showed that social concerns introduce disagreement among voters who
have the same productivity but belong to different social classes. In spite of this heterogene-
ity, our model allows for a smooth aggregation of individual preferences within the working
class. The intuition is as follows (we present the formal argument in the Appendix). Let
τ∗(θd, kd) ∈ (0, 1) be the preferred tax rate of a given voter (θd, kd) in the working class.
Exploiting the optimality condition of other voters in the working class—(7) equal to 0—we
can define a set of voters whose preferred tax rate coincides with τ∗(θd, kd). These voters
have types (ϑ(θd, kd, k
′
d), k
′
d), where
ϑ
(
θd, kd, k
′
d
)
= θd +Q (θd, kd)
(
k′d − kd
)
(10)
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and function Q is given by
Q (θd, kd) =
ησθλσk
(1 + η)[(1− τ∗ (θd, kd))σθ + λσk]2 − ηλ2σ2k
. (11)
Hence, ϑ identifies the interclass coalition of voters in the working class, whose preferred
tax rate is τ∗ (θd, kd).29 In this respect, Q measures the marginal adjustment in the produc-
tivity dimension needed to compensate for a marginal change in social class and guarantee
that the optimal tax rate does not change. Hence, it measures the heterogeneity in the pro-
ductivity levels of the members of the coalition. If Q is small, the set of voters who share the
same preferred tax rate is relatively homogeneous in terms of productivity. In contrast, if Q
is large, the coalition includes voters with heterogeneous productivity levels. Moreover, since
Q ≥ 0, the coalition includes relatively less productive individuals in low social classes and
relatively more productive individuals in high social classes. It is worthwhile to point out
that coalitions are heterogeneous in terms of productivity even if productivity is identically
distributed across all classes. In other words, the heterogeneity in interclass coalitions does
not stem from the correlation between productivity and social class, but from the existence
of social concerns.
As we change the relevance of social concerns, the composition of coalitions changes in
two ways: directly, because Q depends on η, and indirectly, because Q depends on τ∗, which,
in turn, depends on η. The former mechanism implies a positive correlation between the
importance of social concerns and the heterogeneity of interclass coalitions. This happens
because, as the importance of social concerns increases, voters with productivity below the
average suffer more from comparisons in terms of consumption; hence, a larger increase in
productivity is needed to compensate for an increase in social class, and keep the preferred
29As we vary k′d, ϑ may fall outside the working class, i.e. ϑ 6∈ [θd,min0]. In this case, the voter does not
belong to the interclass coalition. This turns out to be irrelevant in our discussion.
25
tax rate constant. The latter channel, instead, is driven by the fact that a change in the
importance of social concerns modifies the optimal tax rate of voters who belong to the
same coalition differently depending on their actual types.30 This leads to a change in the
composition of coalitions, hence in their heterogeneity in terms of productivity.
Despite the potential indeterminacy that these two channels can generate, if the social
class of a voter is sufficiently high, the heterogeneity in productivity levels within a coalition
unambiguously widens as the relevance of social concerns increases.
Proposition 4. Let (θd, kd) be a voter in the working class and suppose that kd ≥ h(θd).
Then, Q (θd, kd) is increasing in η.
Interclass coalitions can be easily constructed within the working class because the con-
cavity of the utility function implies a unique optimal tax rate, which can be characterized
by the first-order condition. When we move out from the working class, voters’ utility func-
tions may no longer be strictly concave in τ ; hence, the optimal tax rate may not be unique
and the first order condition may not identify it (see Example 1 below). Nonetheless, in
the benchmark model in which η = 0, deadweight losses from taxation guarantee that the
preferred tax rate of any voter with productivity lower or equal than the mean satisfies the
first-order condition
ϕ (τ, θd, kd) :=
∂v(τ, τθ | θd, kd)
∂τ
= 0. (12)
Moreover, because Q ≡ 0, interclass coalitions are homogeneous in terms of productivity,
namely ϑ (θd, kd, k
′
d) = θd .
By continuity, if we pick any voter with productivity strictly below the mean, we can find
values of η small enough to guarantee that (12) still identifies the agent’s unique optimal tax
rate. In other words, as long as the relevance of social concerns is not too high, we can define
30To see this, it is sufficient to apply the implicit function theorem to (7) after setting it equal to 0.
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interclass coalitions that span all productivity levels below the average. Then, for any voter
(θd, kd) with productivity below the average, we can use Proposition 1 and the definition of
interclass coalitions to collapse one of the two dimensions of voters’ heterogeneity (namely,
the social class dimension) and split the population in two groups: voters whose preferred
tax rate is higher than τ∗(θd, kd) and voters whose preferred tax rate is lower than τ∗(θd, kd).
Under the same conditions, Proposition 4 extends as well.
Because the median productivity is lower than the average productivity, we can apply
standard results in this unidimensional space and characterize the unique political equilib-
rium of a Downsian model of electoral competition in which two candidates announce a
vector of policies (τ, g) under the constraint g = τθ. This equilibrium involves both candi-
dates announcing the preferred tax rate of the “median voter” in the unidimensional space.
This tax rate is the Condorcet winner and we denote it τV E .31
To formalize this argument, for any voter in the working class (θd, kd) define:
ψ (θd, kd) =
∫ kd,max
kd,min
∫ ϑ(θd,kd,y)
θd,min
fd (x, y) dxdy. (13)
Function ψ measures the mass of the electorate with preferred tax rate above the one of
such working class voter. The equilibrium tax rate of the political game coincides with the
preferred tax rate of any type (θd, kd) for which ψ(θd, kd) = 1/2. This last equation identifies
decisive voters (θd, kd): half of the electorate has a preferred tax rate greater or equal than the
one of decisive voters and the opposite is true for the other half.32 This coalition of decisive
voters plays the same role of the median voter in a setting in which voters heterogenity is
unidimensional. Within this coalition, and with no loss of generality, we identify as a specific
31Consider any pair of announcements by politicians in which at least one of the two tax rates is not τV E .
Then, any candidate who is winning with probability lower than 1 (such candidate must exist and cannot be
already announcing τV E) could deviate to τV E and be strictly better off. We conclude that none of these
profiles of policy announcements can be an equilibrium of the political game.
32Obviously, if ψ(θ∗d, kd,min) = 1/2, then ψ(ϑ (θ
∗
d, kd,min, k
′
d) , k
′
d) = 1/2 for any k
′
d. This indeterminacy
does not play any role in our analysis.
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decisive voter the agent in the lowest possible social class. We denote him by (θ∗d, kd,min).
Proposition 5. There exists η > 0 such that, if η ≤ η, the equilibrium tax rate τV E is
unique and coincides with the preferred tax rate of the decisive voter (θ∗d, kd,min). Thus, τ
V E
and (θ∗d, kd,min) jointly satisfy the system:
ϕ
(
τV E , θ∗d, kd,min
)
= 0 (14)
ψ(θ∗d, kd,min)−
1
2
= 0 (15)
Equations (14)-(15) characterize the equilibrium of the political game. From an opera-
tional point of view, they can be used to compute the equilibrium by deriving the preferred
tax rate τ∗ (θd, kd,min) of increasingly more productive individuals and search for the pro-
ductivity level that satisfies (15).
Note that social concerns influence the voting equilibrium in two ways. First, as described
by Proposition 2, they affect the preferred tax rate of each individual, hence of the decisive
voter. Second, they affect the identity of the decisive voter (θ∗d, kd,min) because they modify
interclass coalitions through function Q (see Proposition 4). If either of the parameters η, σθ
and σk is equal to zero, then Q ≡ 0 and the second effect can be ignored. This enables a
simple characterization of the equilibrium tax rate.
Remark 2. If social concerns are not relevant (η = 0) then τV E = τ∗B(θ
m
d ). If social
concerns matter and voters are homogeneous in terms of social class (η > 0, σk = 0) then
τV E = min
{
1, ∂`−1(−(1 + η)θd)/∂τ
}
> τ∗B(θ
m
d ). If social concerns matter and voters are
homogeneous in terms of productivity (η > 0, σθ = 0), then τ
V E = 0.
Remark 2 states that, when social comparisons are not relevant, the results in Meltzer
and Richard (1981) hold true in our setting: the tax rate in the voting equilibrium coincides
with the preferred tax rate of the median voter. This happens also when social concerns are
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relevant, but voters are homogeneous in terms of social class. However, the decisive voter
now supports redistribution also because he wants to reduce the social stigma he suffers
in the consumption dimension. Thus, social concerns reinforce economic voting and the
equilibrium tax rate is higher. Finally, if there is no heterogeneity in terms of productivity,
individuals do not enjoy any redistributive benefit, but taxation is still distortionary. Then,
all voters support a tax rate equal to 0, which thus emerges as the equilibrium outcome.33
Now suppose that Q is bounded away from 0 and that the assumption of Proposition 5
holds (i.e., η ≤ η). Then, a change in the relevance of social concerns affects both voters’
preferences and the composition of the interclass coalitions. In other words, differently from a
standard model of redistribution a´ la Meltzer and Richard (1981), the identity of the decisive
voter (and of his coalition) is not fixed, but it varies in response to changes in η. Focusing
on this last effect, we get:
∂
∂η
(∫ kd,max
kd,min
∫ ϑ(θ∗d ,kd,min,y)
θd,min
fd(x, y)dxdy
)
=
∫ kd,max
kd,min
∂Q(θ∗d, kd,min)
∂η
· (y − kd,min) · fd(ϑ(θ∗d, kd,min, y), y)dy. (16)
Because kd,min is the lowest social class, the sign of this expression is determined by the
effect of an increase in social concerns on the heterogeneity in productivity among decisive
voters, ∂Q/∂η. When it is positive, the mass of voters whose preferred tax rate is higher
than τ∗(θ∗d, kd,min) becomes larger than 50%. Then, to restore (15), the productivity of the
decisive voter must decrease. Therefore, if the class of the original decisive voters is h(θ∗d),
Proposition 2 implies that the new decisive voter supports higher levels of redistribution and
the equilibrium tax rate goes up. The statement of the next proposition exploits the fact
that, when η = 0, the decisive voter is θmd .
33The results in Remark 2 hold true also in the limit as each one of the parameters η, σθ or σk goes to 0.
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Proposition 6. Suppose η < η. If kd,min = h(θ
m
d ), the productivity of the decisive voter is
decreasing in η and the equilibrium tax rate is increasing in it.
Proposition 6 implies that if the median productivity in the society is sufficiently lower
than the average—graphically, if the decisive voter (θmd , kd,min) does not lie in the region
highlighted with vertical lines in Figure 1—social concerns push the equilibrium tax rate
above what would emerge without them. In terms of cross-country comparisons, the last
statement implies that if two countries have the same distribution over types and the median
productivity is sufficiently below the average, then redistribution is higher in the country
where social concerns are stronger. To put it differently, in societies with right-skewed income
distribution, tax rates increase with the overall importance of social concerns.
Instead, if the median productivity in the society is close to the average —the decisive
voter lies inside the region highlighted with vertical lines in Figure 1—the effect of a change in
the relevance of social concerns on the equilibrium tax rate can go in either direction. On the
one hand, Proposition 2 implies that an increase in η makes the decisive voter more adverse
to redistribution because the stigma he suffers in the social class dimension gets amplified.
On the other hand, an increase in η also changes the identity of the voter, shifting him
toward a less productive individual.34 This pushes the equilibrium tax rate up. Depending
on which of the two effects prevails, the equilibrium level of redistribution may thus decrease
or increase.
The results discussed so far hold as long as the relevance of social concerns is not too
large, η < η. If this condition fails, aggregation may fail as well. Indeed, when η is large,
the utility of voters may not be concave in taxation and this could lead to the non-existence
of an equilibrium tax rate. To gain intuition, consider the following example with a discrete
34To see this, suppose the productivity of the decisive voter is not decreasing in η. Then, by Proposition
1, there are voters to the north-west of the crossing point between the decisive voter’s interclass coalition and
h(θd) for whom a raise in η results in a lower preferred tax rate. By Proposition 2 these very same voters
should react to an increase in η by raising their preferred tax rate. This establishes a contradiction.
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number of types.
Example. Suppose a unit mass of individuals is split in three different groups depending
on their types: 49% has type (θ, k) = (3, 3), 49% has type (θ, k) = (4, 3.2) and 2% has type
(θ, k) = (3.51, 3.55). Let tax distortions be given by `(τ) = τ2. Finally, assume that the
relevance of social concerns is high, η = 3. Then, the first two groups have single-peaked
preferences with optimal tax rates at τ ' 0.71 and at τ = 0, respectively. Instead, the utility
function of the third group has a local maximum at τ ' 0.1 and a global maximum at τ = 1. It
is then easy to check that, for any tax rate τ , we can find another tax rate τ ′ that is preferred
to τ by a majority of the population.35 Hence, the Downsian model of electoral competition
has no equilibrium in pure strategies τV E. Instead, if the relevance of social concerns is not
too large, say η = 1, all three groups have single-peaked preferences and the optimal tax rate
of the third group is the equilibrium tax rate, τV E ' 0.026 (a similar conclusion would hold
true also for any η < 1).
The example shows that, when the relevance of social concerns is large, political equilibria
in pure strategies may not exist. Nonetheless, following Bierbrauer and Boyer (2018), we
can still provide conditions under which a majority of voters support a small deviation from
a given tax policy. To clarify, let τ s be an arbitrary tax policy, which we assume to be in
place. We say that a marginal tax increase is politically feasible if it is utility-improving for
a majority of voters, namely if
∫{
(θd,kd):
∂v(τ,τθ)|θd,kd)
∂τ
∣∣
τ=τs
>0
} dFd(θd, kd) ≥ 1
2
. (17)
35This is a consequence of the double peak in the utility of the third group. Indeed, any τ ∈ [0, 0.2] is
defeated under pairwise majoritarian voting by τ = 1, which is preferred by the first and third group. Any
τ ∈ [0.2, 0.8] is defeated by τ = 0.1, which is preferred by the second and third group. Finally, any τ ∈ [0.8, 1]
is defeated by τ = 0.71, which is preferred by the first and second group.
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Symmetrically, we say that a marginal tax decrease is politically feasible if:
∫{
(θd,kd):
∂v(τ,τθ)|θd,kd)
∂τ
∣∣
τ=τs
≤0
} dFd(θd, kd) ≥ 1
2
. (18)
Exploiting the analysis carried out in the previous sections, we can provide sufficient
conditions for the existence of a politically feasible marginal tax shift for arbitrary levels
of social concerns. Consider voters (θmd , kd,min) and (θ
m
d , kd,max). By inspecting equation
(7), we can conclude that if voter (θmd , kd,min) supports a marginal tax increase, the same
must be true for all voters with either lower productivity, or higher social class, or both
(in Figure 1, these are the voters to the north-west of him); similarly, if voter (θmd , kd,max)
supports a marginal tax decrease, so do all voters with either higher productivity, or lower
social class, or both (i.e., voters to the south-east of him in Figure 1). Importantly, these
implications are valid no matter the size of η. The definition of median productivity further
implies that both these masses of voters constitute a majority. Hence, voters (θmd , kd,min)
and (θmd , kd,max) can be used to check whether a tax reform is feasible. In particular, if
∂v(τ, τθ) | θmd , kd,min)/∂τ |τ=τs ≥ 0 (∂v(τ s, τ sθ) | θmd , kd,max)/∂τ |τ=τs ≤ 0), the proposal of a
marginal tax increase (decrease) would get the support of the majority of the electorate.36
Finally, it is important to highlight that all the results concerning individual preferences
(Section 4) remain valid also when the relevance of social concerns is high. In other words,
a high value of η poses a problem only when we want to aggregate individual preferences to
obtain an equilibrium in a Downsian model. One possible approach to overcome this problem
is to modify the modeling of the electoral competition. For instance, one could assume
specific voting rules that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium. Alternatively, one could
36Obviously, this is only a sufficient condition: a tax reform can be feasible also if none of the two conditions
is satisfied. In general, to check the feasibility of a tax shift, one can also use voters that are not the ones
with median productivity and still apply the same logic, i.e., verify that 50% of the electorate lies to their
north-west or south-east. Finally, if we restrict attention to the working class (where the first order condition
is guaranteed to identify the unique optimum) we can also use interclass coalitions to verify the feasibility of
a reform. However, in this case, the identity of the relevant interclass coalition would vary with the size of η.
32
model electoral competition with a probabilistic voting model in which the responsiveness of
different groups to changes in redistributive policies is heterogeneous.37 However, both these
approaches would necessarily require a number of additional assumptions that are beyond
the main object of our analysis. We thus do not address this issue in more details.
6. Conclusions
People care about their relative standing in the society and status-seeking behavior has
been proven to be an important driver of economic decisions in a variety of settings. In
this paper, we studied how status concerns affect voters’ preferences toward redistribution
depending on their relative social standing. Our analysis can help rationalize highly debated
deviations from pure economic voting, namely the fact that a non-negligible fraction of
the socioeconomic elites appear to be relatively favorable to redistribution, whereas the
opposite holds true for some members of the working class. We highlighted that social
stratification may lead individuals who have the same gross income to vote for different tax
rates. Similarly, it may lead voters with different incomes to support the same redistributive
policies. This is because voters’ preferences toward redistribution are shaped not only by
their monetary interests (economic voting), but also by their desire to preserve/overcome
the advantages/disadvantages they experience in terms of social class (social-class voting).
When the relevance of social concerns is not too big, the interclass coalitions of voters that
social concerns generate can be used to characterize the equilibrium tax rate. Investigating
the origin and evolution of social concerns in a dynamic environment is a natural direction for
future research. This could shed light on current cross-country differences in the determinants
of social status as well as on the stability of such differences.
37If all groups were equally responsive to changes in policies, a standard probabilistic voting model applied
to our setting would imply that, absent social concerns, the equilibrium tax rate equals 0. This would limit
the ability of such model to investigate the effects of social concerns on redistribution.
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Appendix
Proof of Remark 1.
When η = 0, the utility function of all voters is strictly concave in τ for all τ > 0. Thus,
(7) implies that the optimal tax rate of all voters is unique and equal to 0 if θd ≥ 0 and to
the solution of −θd = d`(τ)/dτ otherwise (corner solutions at τ = 1 are ruled out by the
assumptions in footnote 16).
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider utility function v(τ, g | θd, kd). The function is twice continuously differentiable
and its indifference curves are path-connected (this follows from the fact that the function
is continuous in τ and, furthermore, g enters additively linearly). Furthermore, observe that
∂v(τ, g | θd, kd)
∂τ
= −θd + θ − d`(τ)
dτ
+ ησθ · λσkkd − (1− τ) ((1− τ)σθ + 2λσk) θd
((1− τ)σθ + λσk)2
(A.1)
∂v(τ, g | θd, kd)
∂g
= 1 > 0 (A.2)
It is immediate to verify that (A.1) is everywhere decreasing in θd and increasing in kd. Thus,
the strict Spence-Mirrlees condition holds. Hence, the function has the strict single crossing
property in −θd holding kd constant and in kd holding θd constant. Finally, given the additive
structure of the utility function, v(τ, g | θd, kd) is quasisupermodular. The statement of the
Proposition thus follows from Theorem 4 in Milgrom and Shannon (1994) (see also Gans
and Smart, 1996).
Proof of Proposition 2.
Let θd ∈ [θd,min, 0]. Define hˆ(θd) = (1−τ∗B(θd)) [(1− τ∗B(θd))σθ + 2λσk] θd/(λσk) (recall that
in the absence of social concerns τ∗B(θd) is a singleton). hˆ(θd) is constant with respect to
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η, increasing in θd for all θd ≤ 0 and such that hˆ(0) = 0. Moreover, hˆ(θd) is unconstrained
and may thus be lower than kd,min. Because θd ≤ 0 and hˆ(θd) ≤ 0, the utility function of
voter (θd, hˆ(θd)) is strictly concave in the tax rate. Hence, τ
∗(θd, hˆ(θd)) is a singleton and
it is equal to τ∗B(θd). Pick any type (θd, kd) ∈ [θd,min, θd,max] × [kd,min, kd,max] such that
kd ≥ hˆ(θd). We want to show that τ∗(θd, kd | η) is non-decreasing in η. Pick any η′ and
τ∗ ∈ τ∗(θd, kd | η′) (notice that this may not be a singleton because kd may be above 0).
Because kd ≥ hˆ(θd), Proposition 1 and the previous argument imply τ∗ ∈ [τ∗B(θd), 1] (notice
that the result of Proposition 1 does not depend on the specific set of classes [θd,min, θd,max]×
[kd,min, kd,max] and it extends to any subset of R2). If τ∗ = 0, the result is trivially true.
If τ∗ ∈ (0, 1), (7) must hold with equality. Because τ∗ ≥ τ∗B(θd), it must be the case that
−θd − d`(τ∗(θd, kd))/d(τ) ≤ 0. Hence the last term in (7) must be non-negative. Thus, the
utility function of voter (θd, kd) satisfies the single crossing property in τ with respect to η
and we can conclude that τ∗(θd, kd | η) is non-decreasing in η. Similarly, if τ∗ = 1 at η′, the
last term in (7) must be positive, hence increasing in η. Thus, the single crossing property
implies that τ∗(θd, kd) = 1 for every η′′ ≥ η′. By a symmetric reasoning, if kd < hˆ(θd),
τ∗(θd, kd | η) is non-increasing in η. Parts (i) and (iii) of the proposition follow from defining
h(θd) = max{hˆ(θd), kd,min} for all θd ≤ 0.
Now consider θd ∈ (0, θd,max]. Pick η′ and τ∗ ∈ τ∗(θd, kd | η′). If τ∗ ∈ (0, 1], we can replicate
the same argument as before and conclude that the preferred tax rate is increasing in η (in
this case the fact that the last term in (7) is positive follows directly from the fact that
θd > 0). Suppose instead that τ
∗ = 0. Focus first on the nouveau riche (kd ≤ 0). Obviously
(7) is negative for all τ independently of the value of η. Thus, a tax rate equal to zero
is the unique maximizer, τ∗(θd, kd) = {0} for all η. Now consider types in the elite, i.e.,
(θd, kd) ∈ R2++. If 0 ∈ τ∗(θd, kd,max), let h(θd) = kd,max. Instead, if 0 6∈ τ∗(θd, kd,max),
let h(θd) = inf{kd : 0 6∈ τ∗(θd, kd)}. This set is well defined because the set of maximizers
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is upperhemicontinuous, Proposition 1 holds and we just argued that τ∗(θd, kd) = {0} for
all voters (θd, kd) with kd = 0. Suppose there exist θ
′′
d and θ
′
d such that θ
′′
d > θ
′
d and
h(θ′′d) < h(θ
′
d). By the upperhemicontinuity of the set of maximizers, 0 ∈ τ∗(θ′d, h(θ′d)).
By Proposition 1, 0 ∈ τ∗(θ′′d , h(θ′d)), hence (again by Proposition 1) 0 ∈ τ∗(θ′′d , kd) for all
kd ∈ [h(θ′′d), h(θ′d)]. This contradicts the definition of h(θ′d). Thus, h(θd) is weakly increasing
in θd. For any (θd, kd) ∈ R2++ for which 0 ∈ τ∗(θd, kd | η′), we must have that, for any
τ˜ ∈ [0, 1],
`(τ˜) + τ˜ θd ≥ η′σθ τ˜ · λσkkd − [(1− τ˜)(σθ + λσk) + λσk]θd
(σθ + λσk) · [(1− τ˜)σθ + λσk] . (A.3)
If the right-hand side of (A.3) is negative for all τ˜ ∈ (0, 1], it remains negative for all η ∈ R+.
Thus τ = 0 is the unique best response. Instead, if the right-hand side of (A.3) is positive
for some τ˜∗ (this is possible if and only if kd > θd), we can find η′′ > η′ such that for τ˜∗
the inequality is reversed for any η ≥ η′′ (η′′ is defined as the supremum of ηs for which
(A.3) holds. Since the right-hand side of (A.3) is positive this supremum is well defined).
Then, if η ≥ η′′, there exists τ∗ > 0 such that τ∗ ∈ τ∗(θd, kd | η) for all η ≥ η′′. In either
case, τ∗(θd, h(θd) | η) is non-decreasing in η, proving part (iv) of the proposition. Finally, by
construction, h(θd) is constant in η if θd ≤ 0 and non-increasing in η when θd > 0, proving
part (ii) of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Define polarization as
Π =
kd,max∫
0
0∫
θd,min
τ+fd(θd, kd)dθddkd −
0∫
kd,min
θd,max∫
0
τ−fd(θd, kd)dθdkd, (A.4)
where τ+ = sup{τ∗(θd, kd)} and τ− = inf{τ∗(θd, kd)}. We know that any voter (θd, kd) with
θd > 0 and kd ≤ 0 has a unique preferred tax rate equal to 0 for any profile of parameters
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(see proof of Proposition 2). The proposition thus follows if we can show that for any (θd, kd)
with θd ≤ 0 and kd > 0, any optimal tax rate τ∗(θd, kd) is weakly increasing in η and weakly
increasing in σθ (weakly decreasing in σk) when σθ < λσk. The first result follows from
Proposition 2 after noticing that kd > 0 ≥ h(θd) (recall that h(·) is weakly increasing in θd
and equal 0 at θd = 0). Now consider changes in σθ (the proof for σk is analogous). At τ = 0,
(7) is positive for any type (θd, kd) with θd ≤ 0 and kd > 0. Thus 0 cannot be an optimal
tax rate. Differentiating (7) with respect to σθ we get that ∂
2v(τ, τθ | θd, kd)/∂τ∂σθ ≥ 0
if and only if [λσk − (1 − τ)σθ]kd ≥ 2λσk(1 − τ)θd. Since θd ≤ 0 and kd > 0, the previous
inequality is always satisfied if λσk ≥ σθ. Monotone comparative static results (see Milgrom
and Shannon, 1994 and the proof of Proposition 1 above) thus imply that any optimal tax
rate τ∗(θd, kd) is non-decreasing in σθ.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Because the utility function of voters is strictly concave, τ∗(θd, kd) is a singleton. Then
∂Q(θd, kd | η, σθ, σk)
∂η
=
=
σθλσk[σθ(1− τ∗(θd, kd)) + λσk][(σθ(1− τ∗(θd, kd)) + λσk) + 2σθη(1 + η)∂τ∗∂η ]
[(1 + η)(1− τ∗(θd, kd))σθ + λσk)2 − ηλ2σ2k]2
.
(A.5)
Such derivative is positive if ∂τ
∗
∂η ≥ 0. By Proposition 2, this is the case if kd ≥ h(θd).
Proof of Proposition 5.
Define as in the main text ψ : [θd,min, 0]× [kd,min, 0]→ [0, 1] as follows:
ψ (θd, kd) =
∫ kd,max
kd,min
∫ ϑ(θd,kd,y)
θd,min
fd (x, y) dxdy. (A.6)
Let η = 0. Then, Q(·) ≡ 0 and the utility function of all voters is strictly concave in τ . Thus,
37
each voter has a unique preferred tax rate and, for any θd < 0, this is the rate τ ∈ (0, 1)
that solves ϕ(τ, θd, kd) = 0 (recall that in the benchmark case, we rule out the possibility
that some voters have a preferred tax rate equal to 1 by assuming that function `(τ) is
sufficiently steep). Because θmd < 0, this property holds true for more than 50% of voters.
Moreover, when η = 0, voters’ utility functions do not depend on social class and satisfy
the single crossing property in τ with respect to θd. Then, standard results (cf. Gans and
Smart, 1996) show that the voting equilibrium coincides with the unique policy preferred by
the voter with median productivity. Thus, (14) and (15) must be satisfied.
Now suppose that η > 0. For any voter (θd, kd) ∈ R2−, (8) is negative for all τ ∈ [0, 1]. Define
η1(θd, kd) =

1 if λσkkd ≥ (σθ + 2λσk)θd
θd(σθ+λσk)
2
σθ[λσkkd−(σθ+2λσk)θd] otherwise.
(A.7)
If η ≤ η1(θd, kd)/2, then τ∗(θd, kd), the unique preferred tax rate of voter (θd, kd), is strictly
between 0 and 1 and it is the unique tax rate τ that satisfies ϕ(τ, θd, kd) = 0.
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Furthermore, (8) implies that for any voter (θ′d, k
′
d) ∈ R− × R++, we can define
η2(θ
′
d, k
′
d) =

1 if λσkθd ≤ σθkd
d`2(τ)
dτ2
[(1−τ)σθ+λσk]3
2σθλσk[σθkd+λσkθd]
otherwise.
(A.8)
If η ≤ η2(θ′d, k′d)/2, (8) is negative for every τ ∈ [τ∗(θd, kd), 1].39 By Proposition 1, if
η ≤ η1(θd, kd)/2 we know that the preferred tax rates of types (θd, k′d) with k′d ≥ kd
must be weakly higher than the unique preferred tax rate of voter (θd, kd), τ
∗(θd, kd). If
η ≤ min{η1(θd, kd)/2, η2(θd, k′d)/2}, since the utility function is strictly concave in τ for all
38The threshold guarantees that for these voters ϕ(·) is not negative for all τ . It can be shown that,
because of our assumptions on d`(1)/dτ , ϕ(·) cannot be always positive for all τ .
39The threshold guarantees that (8) is negative for all τ independently of the actual voter.
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τ ∈ [τ∗(θd, kd), 1], the optimal tax rate of voter (θd, k′d) must be unique and it is either 1
or the solution to ϕ(τ, θd, k
′
d) = 0. To rule out the first possibility, we can require η ≤
min{η1(θd, kd)/2, η2(θd, k′d)/2, η3(θd, k′d)/2}, where η3(θd, k′d) = [(d`(1)/dτ) + θd] (λσk/σθk′d).
For every θd ∈ [θd,min, θmd /2], let η∗(θd) := min{η1(θ′d, k′d)/2, η2(θ′d, k′d)/2, η3(θd, k′d)/2} and
observe that this threshold is bounded away from 0 for all θd. Moreover, η
∗(θd) is a con-
tinuous function of θd. Thus, it admits a minimum in the interval [θd,min, θ
m
d /2]. Let this
minimum be η∗. Clearly, η∗ > 0.
Now let η ≤ η∗ and consider voter (θmd , kd,max). By the previous discussion, τ∗(θmd , kd,max)
is unique. By the construction of function ϑ(·) (see (10) and (11)), it must thus be the
case that ϕ(τ∗(θmd , kd,max), ϑ(θd, kd,max, kd), kd) = 0 for all kd. If ϑ(θ
m
d , kd,max, kd) ≥ θd,min,
then τ∗(θmd , kd,max) is also the optimal tax rate of voter (ϑ(θ
m
d , kd,max, kd), kd) (recall that
we are assuming η ≤ η∗). By the definition of ϑ(·), ϑ(θmd , kd,max, kd) ≥ θd,min for all kd if
and only if ϑ(θmd , kd,max, kd,min) ≥ θd,min. Because Q(·) is increasing in τ , this last condition
is satisfied if η ≤ [(kd,max − kd,min) / (θmd − θd,min)] (λσk/σθ) := η4. Following similar steps,
we can also conclude that if η ≤ [(kd,max − kd,min) / ((θmd /2)− θmd )] (λσk/σθ) := η5, then
ϑ(θmd /2, kd,max, kd) ≥ θmd for all kd and τ∗(θmd /2, kd) is the preferred tax rate of all voters
(ϑ(θmd /2, kd,max, kd), kd). Let η
∗∗ := min{η4, η5}. Obviously, η∗∗ > 0.
Define η = min{η∗, η∗∗}. By the previous results, if η ≤ η, any voter (ϑ(θd, kd,max, kd), kd)
with θd ∈ [θmd , θmd /2] and kd ∈ [kd,min, kd,max] has a unique optimal tax rate and this tax
rate solves ϕ(τ, ϑ(θd, kd,max, kd), kd) = 0. Furthermore, for all θd ∈ [θmd , θmd /2] define
ψˆ(θd) =
∫ kd,max
kd,min
∫ ϑ(θd,kd,max,y)
θd,min
fd(x, y)dxdy.
40 (A.9)
40Because η ≤ η, ϑ(θd, kd,max, y) ≥ θd,min for all θd ∈ [θmd , θmd /2].
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The function (A.9) is continuous in θd. We can thus differentiate (10) and get
∂ϑ(θˆd, kd,max, k
′
d)
∂θˆd
= 1 + (k′d − kd,max) ·
∂Q
∂τ
· ∂τ
∗(θˆd, kd,max)
∂θd
> 0, (A.10)
where the inequality follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that ∂Q/∂τ > 0 (cf. (11)).
Because f(θd, kd) > 0 for all (θd, kd), ψˆ(θd) is increasing in θd in the interval [θ
m
d , θ
m
d /2].
Finally, because η ≤ η, the definition of θmd yields that ψˆ(θmd ) < 1/2 and ψˆ(θmd /2) > 1/2.
We conclude that there exists a unique θ†d ∈ [θmd , θmd /2] such that ψˆ(θ†d) = 1/2.
If η ≤ η, starting from voter (θ†d, kd,max), function ϑ
(
θ†d, kd,max, kd
)
uniquely identifies a mass
of voters in each class kd that supports levels of redistribution above or below τ
∗
(
θ†d, kd,max
)
.
Integrating over the set of social classes, we obtain the mass of voters in the overall population
with preferred tax rate above or below τ∗
(
θ†d, kd,max
)
. As argued in the main text, in a
Downsian model of electoral competition both candidates propose the tax rate preferred by
voter (θ†d, kd,max). This is also the preferred tax rate of any voter (ϑ(θ
†
d, kd,max, kd), kd). By
construction, such tax rate is the unique value that solves ϕ
(
τ, ϑ(θ†d, kd,max, kd), kd
)
= 0.
The Proposition follows by defining ϑ(θ†d, kd,max, kd,min) = θ
∗
d.
Proof of Remark 2.
When η = 0, preferences of voters differ only insofar their productivity differ (see (7)).
Because the utility function satisfies the strict single crossing property, we can use standard
results (see Gans and Smart (1996)) to show that the equilibrium tax rate coincides with
the preferred tax rate of the voters with median productivity. The same is true, if η > 0
and σk = 0. However, in this latter case, the preferred tax rate of the voters with median
productivity is given by {d`(−(1 + η)θmd )/dτ, 1}. Because function `(τ) is strictly convex,
this value is greater than τ∗B(θ
m
d ). Finally, if η > 0 and σθ = 0, (7) is negative for all tax
rates and for all voters. Thus, the preferred tax rate of all voters is 0 and the equilibrium
40
tax rate is also equal to 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Pick any voter (θd, kd) ∈ R2− such that kd ≥ h(θmd ). By Proposition 4, Q(θd, kd) is increasing
in η. Hence, the interclass coalition becomes flatter. Furthermore, by Proposition 2, the
preferred tax rate of voter (θd, kd) increases, and so does the preferred tax rate of any voter
(θ′d, kd) with θ
′
d < θd.
41 If kd,min = h(θ
m
d ), (16) together with the previous discussion imply
that the productivity of the decisive voter decreases with η at η = 0, and thus its preferred
tax rate increases with η. Because, h(θd) is constant with respect to η, the same conclusions
are true for any (decisive) voter (θ∗d, kd,min) with θ
∗
d ≤ θmd , thus proving the statement of the
proposition.
41To see this analytically, we can apply the implicit function theorem on (7) and use the fact that kd ≥ h(θd)
and (8) is negative (this follows from the fact that the voter is in the working class) to sign ∂τ∗(θd, kd)/∂η.
41
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